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Abstract: Small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) are recognized global for being the backbone of the 
economy through; economic advancement; innovation, wealth generation and furthering growth. SMEs have 
a high tax non compliance rate which hinders the development they bring to many economies. This paper 
aims to establish the major determinants of tax non-compliance among SMEs in the Zimbabwean economy. 
The survey research design was used and the SMEs operating in the Bulawayo provincewere considered as 
the sample of the study. The stratified random sampling technique was adopted in eliciting information and 
questionnaires were administered in the collection of data from the respondents. 187 questionnaires were 
issued out and 150 were returned. Regression analysis was used to establish the relationship that exists 
between tax non-compliance and the predictive variables, using SPSS ver. 22. The study revealed that poor 
follow-up strategy and lack of a tax audit, high tax rates, financial constraints, abuse of public funds by 
authorities and tax education as the major determinants. SME operators should apply modern business 
survival strategies so as to counter financial constraints. ZIMRA should maintain a database for SMEs for tax 
audit purposes; intensify follow-up strategies, increase tax audits and increase tax support services to SMEs. 
The government should consider reducing tax rates (which are perceived to be too high) as they promote tax 
evasion and failure among SMEs.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Globally, tax compliance among Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) is poor and a major problem as many 
countries fail to come up with ways to cut non-compliance. Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are now 
the major employers and they play a very vital role in the development and growth of the Zimbabwean 
economy, but their contribution to the national budget is affected by tax non-compliance exercised by the 
operators. A study carried out by the Fin mark Trust revealed that Zimbabwe has 3.5 million Small to Medium 
Enterprises with only 2% of all these paying taxes to Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA; Masarirambi, 
2013; CZI, 2015). A number of ways and strategies to cut tax evasion have been devised by ZIMRA as the 
government revenue collecting board to cut non-compliance among SMEs. SMEs is subjected to tax incentives 
as long as they are registered with ZIMRA, they are eligible to enjoy 100% Special Initial Allowance (SIA) on 
qualifying capital assets, which is allowed over a four-year period at the rate of 25% per year 
(www.zimra.co.zw). The Special Initial Allowance is a capital allowance ranked as a deduction, which reduces 
the tax due from the business since it has the benefit of reducing the taxable amount. The incentive enables 
re-investment which empowers growth through more of its earnings that have been retained for business. 
Workshops are conducted by ZIMRA on tax education. Are these methods conducted by ZIMRA real 
incentives for tax compliance? ZIMRA introduced a penalty of 100% of the amount due plus 10% interest per 
year to taxpayers who fail to file their tax returns in the stipulated time (Tapera, 2013). Heavy penalties have 
been charged with the authority to SMEs which fail to comply with the regulations on tax remittances. ZIMRA 
seem to be applying both persuasion and coercion strategies for tax compliance, relying more heavily on the 
semi-military operations which give results in the short run, but proving to be difficult to sustain in the 
prevention of tax evasion. The SMEs contributes a small amount of tax as compared to larger companies; they 
still need to be carefully considered due to the contribution they bring to the economic growth. The question 
then is why do other SMEs comply whilst the majority is not remitted their taxes? What are the major 
determinants of the failure to comply with the regulations of the tax authority? 
 
The government uses tax revenue as the major source for capital and infrastructural development projects 
that will be of benefit even to the SMEs. The findings and recommendations of the study will help ZIMRA in 
the formulation of policies on collection of taxes among SMEs. Tax revenue contributes more than 60% of the 
national budget (Ministry of Finance 2013 and 2014).  Reducing non-tax compliance among SMEs will 
fabricate an environment that eases the running of their businesses in the long run through infrastructural 
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development and economic growth. The study is significant because taxation is the pivot to economic, 
political and social development. The strong tax system plays three major roles in economic development; 
stimulate good governance (Odd-Helge & Rakner, 2009), lessen inequality (Cobham, 2005) and generates 
revenue (Keen, 2012). There is little evidence of research knowledge on the SMEs and tax noncompliance in 
Zimbabwe, previous studies focused on tax compliance challenges in fulfilling tax obligations among SMEs in 
Zimbabwe (Zivanai, Chari, Nyakurimwa, 2016). Utaumire, Mashiri, and Mazhindu (2013) conducted a study 
on the effectiveness of the presumptive tax system in Zimbabwe using ZIMRA as a case study; they did not 
consider the factors which cause tax evasion by SMEs. The study will also provide invaluable insights to the 
Government of Zimbabwe in the formulation of future tax policies and address the major contributing factors 
of tax noncompliance among SMEs. The government has to know and attend to the reasons why SMEs are 
invading taxes as they form the core of the majority of the country’s economy. This paper is organized as 
follows; it gives the aims of the study and briefly defines SMEs in the context of Zimbabwe and reviews 
theoretical and empirical literature from earlier studies. Then method on the data collected in the study will 
be analysed to show the factors which cause tax evasion among SMEs in Zimbabwe. The conclusion will be 
made based on the findings of the study and recommendation of the major determinants of tax non-
compliance among Small and Medium Enterprises in Zimbabwe. 
 
Objectives of the study 
 To identify the major causes of tax non-compliance among SMEs in Zimbabwe. 
 To recommend possible ways of reducing tax non-compliance among SMEs in Zimbabwe. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Definition of SMEs: There are many definitions that have been brought forth by different authors, boards, 
and countries; the study will consider the definition applied in Zimbabwe.  According to Small and medium 
enterprises act, chapter 24:11, an SME is a corporation or an unincorporated business entity which is 
managed by a person or jointly by more persons and it should either be a micro- enterprise or small 
enterprise or medium-sized enterprise. The SME Association of Zimbabwe defines in different categories as 
follows; a business with a turnover of less than US$240 000 or assets less than US$100 000 should be 
formally registered as a small business and a business with assets and turnover above the thresholds 
stipulated for small enterprises, but less than US$1 million each should be registered as a medium enterprise 
(www.smeaz.org.zw). ZIMRA defines SMEs as follows: a business with six (6) to forty (40) employees, annual 
turnover of US$50 000 to US$500 000 and assets valued between US$50 000 to US$1 million is treated as a 
small company, a business with forty-one (41) to seventy-five (75) employees, annual turnover, and assets 
between $1 million and US$2 million should be registered as a medium-sized company. A microenterprise is a 
business that operates below the threshold of a small enterprise (www.zimra.co.zw). All business entities in 
Zimbabwe are expected to remit taxes, according to their tax liability and SMEs also have a tax obligation. 
 
Tax Obligations: Tax Obligations is the amount of tax due according to the current tax law. The Zimbabwe 
Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), as a body responsible for collecting revenue for the country through taxes, get 
its commission from the Revenue Authority Act [Chapter 23:11], which was passed by the parliament of 
Zimbabwe in 2002 and other related legislation. There are a number of taxes that operating SMEs in 
Zimbabwe are expected to remit, they may be obligated to any or all the following: Income Tax, Value Added 
Tax (VAT), Presumptive Tax, Capital gains tax, Pay As You Earn (PAYE), Estate duty tax, Withholding Tax 
(WHT), Investment income tax, among others (www.zimra.co.zw). Small traders who are not qualifying for 
income tax remittance should pay a tax referred to as a Presumptive tax. Those that register for income tax 
purposes with ZIMRA are expected to submit returns and payment of taxes according to the statutory 
requirements. The rate of tax on taxable income is 25% plus 3% Aids Levy (Tapera, 2013).  Utaumire, et al 
(2013) stated that SMEs are willing to pay their tax obligations, which was contrary to the findings of a study 
conducted by Devos, (2014) who said tax payers try by all means to evade taxes; the tax authority should 
come up with strategies to counteract tax evasion. 
 
Strategies to counteract tax evasion: ZIMRA introduced tax audits to reduce tax non-compliance and a 
penalty as a control aimed to reduce or discourage taxpayers from evading tax, a penalty of 100% of the 
amount due and a 10% interest is also used by ZIMRA (ICAZ, 2013). ZIMRA educate taxpayers through 
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holding forums, workshops, and seminars educating the public on how to improve on tax compliance 
(www.zimra.co.zw; ICAZ, 2013). There is a toll-free line for taxpayers to seek clarity anytime on tax issues 
(www.zimra.co.zw). Reduction in the loss of revenue through the use of electronic devices in VAT collection 
and these devices are not to be tampered with. Small and medium businesses are encouraged to adopt 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP) in accounting so as to cut incidences of cheating on 
transactions. Whistle blowing, road patrols on the ZIMRA website and the dismissal of corrupt employees are 
other measures in place (AFRODAD, 2011). According to Mello, (2008) different strategies to cut tax non-
compliance has been introduced in different countries such as tax audits, tax education workshops, tax 
farming, General Anti-avoidance Rule and many others. Amnesty to taxpayers who have defaulted was 
granted by South Africa to bring them back into the tax net. It was not successful with the small and medium 
sized businesses, but a success with larger taxpayers (www.afrodad.org). Zimbabwe granted a six months tax 
amnesty in October 2014 to March 2015, so as to aid taxpayers in regularizing their business affairs, but very 
few businesses came up front to apply for the amnesty. In order to come up with good strategies for tax 
evasion, tax compliance models have been developed by various scholars. 
 
Tax compliance models 
 
The A-S model: The A-S model is a formal economic analysis of tax evasion also known as the Deterrence 
model or Classical Approach; it was pioneered by Allingham and Sandro (1972), taxpayers who are assumed 
to be rational and moral making reasonable economical real decisions. Evading tax is grounded on perceived 
gains or losses (Gahramanov, 2009); if the gain expected by evading taxes is higher than the cost involved 
they evade taxes (Fischer et al. 1992; Devos, 2014). The taxpayers are assumed to have real knowledge of tax, 
penalty and detection rates as utility maximizers (Devos, 2014). The model state that at the moment of 
computing tax returns, the taxpayer is inclined to evade tax to maximize profits (Zivanai, et.al. 2016). The 
questions they have are; how much income should I report and how much tax should I evade? If the tax 
authority has a sound system and the likelihood of being caught is high and the penalties are inevitable, a 
rational economic decision maker will correctly remit taxes (Bătrâncea, 2012). When there is no tax audits 
performed and poor collection systems, taxpayers can remit less tax than what is expected. This implies that 
few taxpayers will evade taxes if detection is certain and penalties are severe (Ali, et.al. 2013). The model has 
been subject to harsh critics, as it assumes that taxpayers are fully rational utility maximizers; empirical 
studies show that many people are honest taxpayers and other taxpayers have never evaded taxes (Gordon, 
1989; Erard & Feinstein, 1994; Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, 1998). Yitzhaki (1974), suggested solutions to 
the shortcomings of the A-S model of tax evasion by setting a penalty on the amount of tax evaded and not on 
the undeclared income (Bătrâncea, et.al., 2012) suggesting the use of the slippery slope model. 
 
Slippery slope model: The slippery slope approach assumes two major views to tax compliance is a 
hindrance of tax evasion by the performance of tax audits and severe fines and on the other hand cultivating a 
trusting relationship between the taxpayers and tax authorities (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl, 
2008). The model suggests that the trust in the tax authorities and power of tax authorities is both key 
dimensions in tax compliance both enforced and voluntary compliance. Power is related strongly to 
antagonistic climate and trust relates strongly to synergistic climate. Power is characterized by view where 
taxpayers are perceived as “robbers” looking for an opportunity to evade tax. This is the scenario in the 
informal sector in Zimbabwe (Zivanai, et al, 2014). Trust cause, voluntary tax compliance as taxpayers 
willingly returns their taxes as they perceive the authorities as a philanthropist in the society (Kirchler, 2007; 
Kirchler et al., 2008). According to the framework maximum level of tax compliance is achieved in the 
conditions of high power and or high trust, though the derived compliance, quality will differ whilst distrust 
and resistance is a result of a ‘cops and robbers’ climate which breeds cheating behavior (Bătrâncea, et.al. 
2012). According to Tayler (2006); Kirchleret al. (2008); Fauvelle‐Aymar (1999) the extent of trust the 
citizens have with their government influences their tax compliance; if they do not trust the government they 
will evade taxes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies (ISSN: 2220-6140) 
Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 242-250, August 2017  
245 
 
Figure 1: The Slippery Slope Framework (Kirchler et al., 2008) 
 
 
Fiscal and Social Psychology Models: The model blends economic deterrence aspects and social 
psychological aspects. Social psychology models focus on variables such as moral values and the perception of 
fairness of the tax system and the tax authorities. The behavior and attitude of taxpayers towards compliance 
is affected by the social groups, norms, and interactions, like any other form of behavior (Snavely 1990). The 
model also assumes that taxpayers are motivated to comply by the presence of government expenditure; if 
the government increases the provision of public goods and services, providing efficient in more accessible 
way commodities that are preferred citizens than tax compliance will increase (Levi 1988; Tilly 1992; Alm et 
al 1992; Moore 2004). Tax paid and the goods and services provided by the government are correlated, 
taxpayers are concerned about what they will get and benefit in the form of public goods and services from 
the government after making their tax payments (Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001; Moore 2004). If taxpayers in 
their circles view government as not willing to return back to the public, they influence each other not to 
comply and people comply believing that their peers are also complying whilst those who cheat understand 
that there are many of their peers who do the same. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The survey research design was used, with the research aims in consideration, data was collected from 
primary sources and the SMEs operating in the Bulawayo provincewere considered asthesample of the study. 
A pre test was conducted to collect feedback about the research instruments. Both questionnaires and 
interviews were used to collect data. After a pilot test was conducted using 10 questionnaires on SMEs in the 
city of Bulawayo.  A Postal questionnaire with closed ended questions, using an eight-point Likert scale was 
sent to 185 entities. Out of the 185 questionnaires issued, 150 were returned. The stratified random sampling 
technique was adopted to elicit information from SMEs operating the province. Ten key-informant interviews 
with accountants were conducted to collect qualitative data (with open-ended questions) from those who had 
responded to the questionnaires. The aim of the interviews was to gain more insights into the survey results 
and check the reliability of the quantitative data obtained through postal questionnaires. A model was 
developed to find the relationship between tax compliance and the determinants of tax compliance (Financial 
constraints, Tax audit, Tax education, Public funds abuse, and Tax rate) and the model was tested using 
regression analysis on SPSS version 22. Analysis of variance was used to check the strength of the 
relationship between dependents and independent variables. Tables were used for data presentation. Data 
collected from the interview was analyzed through summative content analysis and the quantitative data 
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from questionnaires was analyzed using SPSS ver.22. The hypotheses were collapsed into two main 
categories as: 
H0. There is no relationship between tax compliance and any of the determinants (Financial constraints, Tax 
audit, Tax education, Public funds abuse, and Tax rate). 
H1. There is a relationship between tax compliance and at least one of the determinants (Financial constraints, 
Tax audit, Tax education, Public funds abuse, and Tax rate). 
 
Table 1: Tax Compliance and non compliance Studies Reviewed 
Author(s)  Year  Method  Sample Size  Country  Findings of the study 
Mukhlis, 
Utomo & 
Soesetyo 
2014 Descriptive 
Method 
61 
respondents 
Indonesia Taxpayers comply when there is 
fairness and benefits that can be 
received from complying.  
Damayanti 
et.al., 
2015  Descriptive 
Method 
regression 
analysis  
323 
individual 
taxpayers in 
the Central 
Java 
 
Indonesia  Tax compliance behavior is 
influenced by the intention to 
comply, while the intention to 
comply is influenced by subjective 
norms and by the perception of the 
government. 
Appah & 
Wosowei 
2016  Relevant 
diagnostics 
tests and 
multiple 
regression 
models.  
785 
individual 
taxpayers  
Nigeria The findings of the study showed 
that the behavior of taxpayers is 
based on their financial condition, 
risk preference, the nature of the 
society in terms of the level of 
governance. 
Alasfour 
et.al., 
 
2016  Descriptive & 
multivariate 
tests  
375 
respondents 
Jordan The study revealed that the extent 
of the governmental corruption 
and government expenditure has 
an effect on tax compliance. High 
tax rates and the taxation system’s 
being perceived as unjust, causes 
non tax compliance whilst an 
increase in tax audit and heavy 
penalty rates reduces tax evasion. 
Riahi-
Belkaoui 
2004  Multiple 
regression  
30 countries  World-
wide  
The findings showed that tax 
compliance is positively related to 
the level of economic freedom, and 
the effectiveness of laws and 
negatively related to the rate of 
crime as a proxy for moral norms 
Frey & 
Feld 
2002  Descriptive 
statistics and 
regression 
analysis 
23111 
individual 
taxpayers  
Switzerlan
d  
Tax morale of the taxpayers is raised 
when the tax (authority) officials 
treat them with respect. 
Zivanai 
et.al, 
2016 Survey 30 SMEs Zimbabwe 
(Bindura) 
Findings revealed that, lack of trust 
in the tax authority and the fact that 
fellow informal traders are evading 
taxes encourages other taxpayers 
not comply. 
Maseko  2014 Descriptive 
statistics and 
correlation 
163 
respondents 
Zimbabwe 
 (Harare, 
Chitungwi
za and 
Bindura) 
The results indicated that high tax 
rates, the perceptions of SME 
operators about tax fairness, tax 
service quality and government 
spending priorities greatly affect 
their tax compliance decisions. 
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4. Results and Discussion 
 
The regression equation was established as follows: 
 
Table 2: Descriptive results 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic 
Compliance 150 3.36 .152 1.862 
Financial Constraints 150 3.86 .131 1.610 
Tax Audit 150 3.57 .154 1.884 
tax education 150 3.17 .102 1.252 
public funds abuse 150 2.51 .109 1.340 
Tax Rate 150 3.61 .089 1.092 
 
Table 3: Regression statistics 
Model    R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 0.900a 0.809 0.802 0.827 
  
Table 4: ANOVA a 
     
Model    Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1                           Regression 417.961 5 83.592 122.084 .000b 
                             Residual 98.599 144 0.685   
                             Total 519.56 149    
 
Table 5: Coefficients a 
     
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta   
 (Constant) 
Financial Constraints 
Tax Audit 
Tax Education 
Public Funds Abuse 
Tax Rate 
2.277 0.475  4.796 .000 
-0.24 0.052 -0.208 -4.63 .000 
0.754 0.045 0.762 16.636 .000 
0.081 0.059 0.055 1.382 0.169 
-0.121 0.057 -0.087 -2.122 0.036 
-0.176 0.67 -0.103 -2.631 0.009 
 
Table 6: Correlations 
      
 Compliance   Financial 
Constraints 
Tax 
Audit 
Tax 
Education 
Public Funds 
Abuse 
 Tax 
Rate 
Pearson Correlation         
Compliance 
1 -0.621 0.876 0.249  0.021 0.001  
                                                  
Financial Constraints 
-0.621 1 -0.558 -0.028  -0.197  0.037 
                                                  
Tax Audit 
0.876 -0.558 1 0.239  0.060 0.094  
                                                  
Tax Education 
0.249 -0.028 0.239 1  -0.281   0.173 
                                                  
Public Funds Abuse 
0.021 -0.197 0.06 -0.281  1 -0.354 
                                                 
Tax Rate 
0.001 0.037 0.094 0.173  -0.354 1  
 
The average compliance rating was 3.36 whilst the average education rating was 3.17 and that of public funds 
abuse was at 2.51 as shown in table 2. The results of the regression analysis shown in table 3 above were 
used to test the relationship between tax compliance and financial constraints, tax audit, tax education, public 
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funds abuse and tax rate among small to medium enterprises in Zimbabwe.   The analysis shows that the 
adjusted R squared= 0.802; 80% of changes in tax compliance is explained by financial constraints, tax audit, 
tax education, public funds abuse and the tax rate. Correlation among predictor variables appears to be low 
and acceptable as shown in table 6 above. The model was run at 5% level of significance and the following 
results were obtained. The ANOVA summarized in table 4 reveals that p-value=0.00 which is less than 0.05 
demonstrating a significant and valid model. The model reveals that tax compliance is inversely related to 
financial constraints; if financial constraint increase non-compliance, increase as shown by a coefficient of (-
0.24) and results are similar to the findings by Appah & Wosowei, (2016). Tax audit has a strong positive 
relationship with tax compliance; with more tax audit there is an increase in tax compliance, these results are 
the same with the findings of Riahi-Belkaoui, (2004); Alasfour, et.al., (2016), and tax audit has the highest 
influence on compliance as is shown by a coefficient of (0.754). The A-S model also supports the results of the 
study; it states that if tax audit and follow-up strategies are poor, taxpayers will evade taxes and if penalties 
are not severe non-compliance will be high (Bătrâncea, 2012; Devos, 2014; Ali, et.al. 2013; Zivanai, et.al. 
2016). These findings are in agreement with the results by Utaumire et al (2013) and Zivanai, et.al (2014) 
who noted that ZIMRA has weak follow-up and insufficient awareness campaigns. 
 
Tax education has a positive insignificant relationship with tax compliance (coefficient=0.081), among all the 
variables it has the lowest influence. Public funds abuse has a negative relationship with to tax compliance as 
shown by a coefficient of -0.121 and (tax rate) -.0176; if public funds are abused there is increase in non-
compliance, the results are consistent with results by Fjeldstad and Semboja (2001); Frey & Feld , (2002); 
Moore (2004);Riahi-Belkaoui, (2004); Maseko, (2014); Mukhlis, Utomo & Soesetyo, (2014); Dube (2014); 
Damayanti et.al., (2015); who stated that tax compliance is correlated with government expenditure on public 
goods and services and there is a strong negative relationship between the two. The tax rate is negatively 
related to tax compliance (coefficient= -. 0176); an increase in tax rate will reduce tax compliance, the results 
are correlative to the findings of Ojeka and Ojochogwu (2012); Alasfour, et.al, (2016) who agreed that high 
tax rates promote tax evasion among SMEs 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The study examined the predictors of tax non-compliance among SMEs in Zimbabwe. Three main models on 
tax compliance were reviewed on literature, strong evidence of tax compliance determinants was provided. 
The study concluded that major leading factors in tax non-compliance of taxpayers are a lack of tax audit and 
poor follow-up strategies by the tax authority, high tax rates, financial constraints, public funds abuse by 
government and tax education. Taxpayers are aware of tax obligation and the possibility of being detected by 
tax authority is low though the penalties are heavy. ZIMRA should improve the tax administration system and 
reinforce the tax collection strategies and follow up on SMEs. Tax incentives like lowering the tax rates and 
tax reform will increase the revenue collection of taxes. Massive campaigns against evasion and avoidance of 
tax and intensive tax education should be embarked on. ZIMRA employees should also be well equipped for 
easy detection of tax evasion. Governments can consider developing a new tax system that suits SMEs which 
will lower compliance costs. Tax rates are perceived to be too high. The government should consider revising 
the tax policy or reducing tax rates as they promote tax evasion and failure among SMEs businesses. More 
support and increased tax incentives through tax support services should be offered to SMEs to cut their 
failure rate as they are the engine of economic growth. 
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